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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.
LIVIO RAMIREZ,

:

Case No. 900439-CA
Priority #2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Honorable
Robin W. Reese, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

A jury found Mr. Ramirez guilty of Interference With

a Peace Officer Making a Lawful Arrest, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1990) after a trial held on
June 22, 1990.

-1 -

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(d) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (1990) whereby a defendant in a criminal action
in Circuit Court may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment and conviction.

In this case, final judgment and

conviction were rendered by the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge,
Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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TEXTS OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14, Constitution of the State of Utah:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann., Section 76-8-305:
A person is guilty of a Class B Misdemeanor if
he has knowledge, or by the exercise of
reasonable care, should have knowledge, that a
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest or detention of himself or another and
interferes with such arrest or detention by use
of force or by use of any weapon.
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-2:
A peace officer may make an arrest under
authority of a warrant or may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or
attempted in the presence of any peace
officer; "presence" includes all of the
physical senses or any device that enhances
the activity, sensitivity, or range of any
physical sense, or records the observations of
any of the physical
senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a
felony has been committed and has reasonable
-3 -

cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe
the person has committed a public offense, and
there is reasonable cause for believing the
person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid
arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the
commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage
property belonging to another person.

-4 -

STATEMENT OP THE ISSUE
Did the trial court err by denying defendant's pretrial
motion to suppress evidence based on an illegal entry of his home,
or in the alternative allow the jury to be instructed that since the
entry was illegal the defendant had a right to reasonably resist any
arrest that followed upon the illegal entry?

-5 -

STATEMENT OF THE PACTS

On May 18, 1990, Livio Ramirez had a few friends and family
over to celebrate his sister's baby's birthday (R. 95 at 69). After
his guests left his house and went to their cars, Livio's brother
Gabriel got in an argument with their brother-in-law James (R. 95 at
69).

Gabriel and James left on foot and Livio went to calm Gabriel

down (R. 95 at 69). He found Gabriel and James near Trolley Square
(R. 95 at 69).
Officer Smith was on duty at the time assisting a Channel 4
News crew near Trolley Square (R. 94 at 4).

Officer Smith observed

two individuals arguing, and one of these two men swung at a third
who approached the area (R. 94 at 5).

Officer Smith identified

himself and the larger of the two men said something to him (R. 94
at 5).

Both individuals were intoxicated (Id.) . While Officer

Smith radioed for backup, a barricade was thrown into the side
window of his car (R. 94 at 6). Officer Smith identified Gabriel as
the most aggressive one of the two, the one who had swung at the
third party (R. 94 at 8).

Livio was identified as having been vocal

but not violent toward anyone (R. 94 at 8).
At this point, Gabriel and Livio started to run and Officer
Smith ran after them (R. 94 at 7).

He and one of the backup

officers, Officer Bigelow, caught Gabriel and Livio continued to run
(R. 94 at 7).

Officer Smith chose to follow Gabriel, because he

believed that Gabriel had been the one to throw the barricade (R. 94
at 8) .

-6 -

Officer Rowley arrived on the scene with Officer Bigelow
and saw Officers Smith and Rowley apprehend Gabriel (R. 94 at 16).
Officer Rowley had responded to the scene to backup Officer Smith,
because he was having trouble with n a drunk" (R. 94 at 19). Officer
Smith followed Livio into a house through the front door and into
the living room area (R. 94 at 17-18).
Within seconds of entering the house, Officer Rowley
approached Livio past Livio's dog who was barking and snapping (R.
95 at 61-62).

As Officer Rowley grabbed Livio, he was bitten by

Livio's dog (R. 95 at 64). Almost immediately, Officer Heaps
arrived, and the two of them tried to cuff Livio, who would not
cooperate by letting the officers get to his hands (R. 95 at 57-59).
Gabriel was charged with the damage to Officer Smith's
vehicle (R. 95 at 46-47), and Livio was charged with Assault on a
Peace Officer and Interference with a Peace Officer Making a Lawful
Arrest (R. 95 at 26). At a jury trial on June 22, 1990, Livio was
acquitted of the Assault charge and convicted of the Interference
charge (R. 67, 68 and 95 at 136). The Assault charge was based on
Livio having allegedly said "sic'em" or "get'em" to his dog as
Officer Rowley approached (R. 95 at 125-126).
Mr. Ramirez, by means of pretrial motion (R. 27-28), asked
the trial court to exclude all evidence following Officer Rowley's
illegal entry into his home and dismiss the charges against him (R.
94 at 25) or in the alternative to instruct the jury that since the
entry was illegal, Mr. Ramirez had a right to reasonably resist any
arrest that followed (R. 94 at 34-35).

The motion was raised under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
-7 -

Constitution and case law concerning "hot pursuit" (R. 94 at 23) and
the right to reasonably resist unlawful arrest (R. 94 at 26). In
addition, the trial court was asked to consider the extra protection
afforded individuals by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution as explained in State v. Larocco/ (R. 94 at 24). The
motion was taken under advisement.
On the day of trial, the motion was denied (R. 95 at 3 ) ,
because it would be bad public policy to allow such resistance even
if reasonable (Id.).

The court found the entry was legal, (R. 95 at

96) and that in any case there was no right to resist an arrest
following an illegal entry (R. 95 at 98-99).
Defendant's offered instruction, number 22, on right to
resist was withdrawn reserving the right to appeal the decision of
the court (R. 41 and 95 at 135-36).

-8 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Ramirez1 right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures was violated in this case.

The Utah Code is silent on

an officer's rights in this exact situation; therefore, Officer
Rowley did not have statutory authority to enter Mr. Ramirez' home.
Any interpretation of the Utah Code to include this situation,
however, would run afoul of both the Utah and United States
constitutions.

Officer Rowley had no warrant, his probable cause to

believe Mr. Ramirez had committed any crime was tenuous, the crime
he could connect Mr. Ramirez to at all was minor, and the only
exigency was that Mr. Ramirez was in flight when first sighted.
The "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement does not
apply in circumstances such as these under either the state or
federal constitution.
Since Officer Rowley could not be inside Mr. Ramirez' home,
the case against Mr. Ramirez for Interference with a Police Officer
should have been dismissed pursuant to the trial court suppressing
all evidence following the illegal entry.

Even if the Court is

reluctant to grant this remedy, however, the trial court should have
allowed an instruction on the defendant's right to resist an arrest
based on the illegal entry of his home.

-9 -

ARGUMENT
POINT:

The trial court erred when it denied Mr, Ramirez1
pretrial motion to suppress evidence or in the
alternative instruct the jury that he had a fTght
to reasonably resist the arrest following an
illegal entry.
[Pjhysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citations omitted).
To be arrested in the home involves not only the
invasion attendant to all arrests but also an
invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is
simply too substantial an invasion to allow
without a warrant, at least in the absence of
exigent circumstances, even when it is
accomplished under statutory authority and when
probable cause is clearly present.
Id. at 588-89 (citations omitted).
In the present case, Mr. Ramirez was arrested in his home
following a warrantless entry without consent into his home by
Officer Rowley.

The State must show that such entry was

accomplished under statutory authority, with clear probable cause
and in the face of exigent circumstances.

Id.

If the State cannot

persuade this Court that the denial created no error involving a
constitutional right, then that error can be considered harmless
only if the reviewing court is persuaded by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
A. Officer Rowley's entry of Mr. Ramirez1 home
was illegal.
As has been noted above, there are three requirements that
must be present to support the warrantless entry of Mr. Ramirez'
-10-

home.

Mr. Ramirez contends that none of the three are strongly

present, but he need only show that the State cannot prove all are
present.
1. Officer Rowley's entry was not supported by
Statutory authority.
Chapter 7 of Title 7 of the Utah Code provides the
statutory authority for arrests in the state (see Addendum A for a
reproduction of a portion of the chapter).

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2

provides the framework for a warrantless arrest.

Section (1) allows

for a warrantless arrest by a peace officer, if a public offense is
committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer.
Section (2) allows for such an arrest, if the arresting officer has
reasonable cause to believe both that a felony has been committed
and that the arrested person is the person who committed the
felony.

Section (3) allows such an arrest if the officer has

reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public
offense and there is reasonable cause to believe the person might
avoid arrest by flight or concealment.
Officer Smith observed Gabriel Ramirez swing at a person on
the street near Trolley Square (R. 94 at 4-5). Gabriel was observed
to be aggressive or violent (R. 94 at 8) and was assumed by Officer
Smith to be the one who threw the barricade (R. 94 at 8 ) . Livio was
possibly intoxicated (R. 94 at 5) and was vocal but not violent (R.
94 at 8 ) . And this was consistent with the actions of someone who
was trying to calm an aggressive friend down.
Officer Smith was the officer who observed Mr. Ramirez1
initial actions.

Mr. Ramirez was at most intoxicated according to

Officer Smith's testimony.

Section (1) would allow Officer Rowley
-11-

to arrest Mr. Ramirez, if Officer Smith observed Mr. Livio Ramirez
commit a public offense.

Officer Smith did not see Livio or Gabriel

throw the barricade, but he assumed Gabriel had, since Gabriel had
been the aggressive one of the two men.

Gabriel, not Livio, had

been vocally abusive or aggressive physically.

Section (1) does not

give Officer Rowley authority to arrest Mr. Ramirez, since Officer
Smith had no such authority.
Under Section (2) Officer Rowley would have to personally
have reasonable cause to believe Mr. Livio Ramirez had committed a
felony.

Officer Rowley may have had reasonable suspicion that Mr.

Ramirez was involved in a crime, but he did not have reasonable
cause to believe a felony had been committed.
Section (3) is arguably the best support for an arrest of
Mr. Ramirez.

Officer Rowley knew Livio was in flight to avoid

Officer Smith.

However, reasonable cause is a higher standard than

reasonable suspicion and at most Officer Rowley had only reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop Mr. Ramirez to see if he had indeed
been involved in a crime.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Therefore, even Section (3) does not support the arrest.

At most

Officer Rowley could stop Mr. Ramirez pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§77-7-15, which allows a stop for reasonable suspicion, but the stop
may occur only in a public place.
However, even if this Court finds authority for the arrest
under §77-7-2 the inquiry does not stop there because the chapter
goes on to talk about entry into a home.

§77-7-5 allows for a night

arrest for a misdemeanor under a warrant, only if the warrant
specifically allows a night arrest, or if the person is in a
-12-

public place, or if the person is encountered by an officer
performing another lawful act pursuant to his or her duties.
Officer Rowley could not have arrested Mr. Ramirez in his home for a
misdemeanor with a warrant in this situation, unless otherwise
authorized.

It cannot be argued then that the Utah Code provides

affirmatively for Mr. Ramirez1 warrantless arrest in his own home
under these circumstances, since more protection is available to a
person if no warrant is in existence.
2. Clear probable cause to arrest Mr. Ramirez
was not present.
Probable cause exists for an arrest, when an officer does
not see the offense being committed, when
from the facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom,
a reasonable and prudent person would be
justified in believing that the suspect had
committed the offense.
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) (citations
omitted).
The law enforcement officer need not have certain
knowledge of the guilt of the suspect.
Id.

However, the person arrested must be in "same fashion related"

to the crime for which probable cause exists.

Id.

The problem in the present case is twofold.

Officer Rov, ey

did not have probable cause to believe any particular crime had been
committed.

Officer Smith witnessed a vandalism and suspected that

Gabriel Ramirez had committed the crime.

Therefore there is not

probable cause to believe Livio had committed that particular crime
which definitely had occurred.

The connection between crime and

suspect was weak and that form of relationship probable cause did
not exist.

Mr. Ramirez was observed to be intoxicated (R. 94 at 5) and
vocal (R. 94 at 8).

He could have been stopped for further

investigation into a public intoxication charge. Here the probable
cause that a public offense had been committed was weak.
The State can show only weak probable cause of a crime
committed by Mr. Ramirez. Officer Rowley himself testified at trial
that he was trying to talk to Livio, during the initial contact
inside the home (R. 94 at 55).

Officer Rowley was in the home to

find out what had happened, not to arrest Mr. Ramirez.
3. Exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry
were not present.
[Ejxceptions to the warrant requirement are few
in number and carefully delineatedf.]
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (citations omitted).
Once such exception is the existence of probable cause and exigent
circumstances. Welsh, at 749, citing Payton at 583-590. An area of
this exception is known as "hot pursuit" and applies when an officer
chases a suspect into his or her home. Welsh at 750. Prior to
Welsh the United States Supreme Court applied "hot pursuit" only to
a fleeing felon. Welsh at 750; citing United States v. Santana
U.S. 38 (1976); and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

427

The

Welsh Court refused to consider the question of whether "hot
pursuit" should be limited to pursuit of fleeing felons; Welsh at
749 n.ll. However, the Court in dicta pointed out to the
"importance of the felony limitation on such arrests." Welsh at
750, n.12.
When the government's interest is only to
arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of
unreasonableness [of such an entry] is difficult
to rebut, and the government usually should be
-14-

allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant
issued upon probable cause by a neutral and
detached magistrate.
Welsh at 750. This is because the suppression of a minor crime is
not
more important than the security of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. When
an officer undertakes to act as his own
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to
justify it by pointing to some real immediate and
serious consequences if he postponed action to
get a warrant.
Welsh at 751 (citation omitted).
The Court in Welsh was talking about the crime of driving
under the influence. Here the only possible crime Livio can be
clearly connected to is public intoxication and the probable cause
is weak, as noted above.

This is not the kind of crime that should

allow the "hot pursuit" by a police officer into the home of a
fleeing person. Other states have adopted this approach and
disallowed "hot pursuit" for driving through a red light, City of
Seattle v. Altshuler, 766 P.2d 518 (Wash.App. 1989), for misdemeanor
assault, Masden v. State, 294 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.Cr.App. 1951), and
speeding, People v. Strelow, 292 N.W.2d 517 (Mich.App. 1980).
Altshuler points to eleven factors involved in a
determination if exigent circumstances are present:
(1)

the gravity of the offense;

(2) whether or not the suspect is armed;
(3)

reasonably trustworthy information as to the suspect's

guilt;
(4)

is the suspect on the premises;

(5) fear that the suspect will escape;

-15-

(6) peaceable entry;
(7) hot pursuit;
(8) fleeing suspect;
(9) danger to officer or public;
(10) mobility of any vehicle involved;
(11) mobility or destructibility of evidence.
Altshuler at 520. Numbers 10 and 11 do not apply here. Numbers 4,
7 in its nontechnical sense, and 8 are clearly present. Numbers 1,
3 and 6 are clearly not present. Numbers 2, 5 and 9 are unclear in
the officer's mind, but it is clear from the overall picture that
these factors are not present. Gabriel may have shown himself to be
dangerous, but Livio did not.

It is likely he would have stayed put

once entering his house. Exigent circumstances did not clearly
exist here.
It should also be pointed out that the Utah Supreme Court
has found a stronger requirement of exigent circumstances under
Article I, Section 14, when the case law under the federal
constitution is unclear.
(Utah 1990).

State v. Larocco, 294 P.2d 460, 466-70

Although the Larocco case considers the need for

exigent circumstances in the search of an unattended car, Mr.
Ramirez urges this Court to apply it to this circumstance, if no
clarity is found in the case law under the federal constitution.
The concerns mentioned in Welsh are present here, and the case can
be decided under the Fourth Amendment or the stronger protections of
Article I, Section 14. The "traditional" justification for
warrantless seizures were not present here,
-16-

namely to protect the safety of the police or the
public, or to prevent the destruction of evidence.
Larocco at 470.

Gabriel, not Livio, was a danger to the police and

public.
For the above reasons, Mr. Ramirez asks this Court to
suppress all evidence following the illegal entry in this case and
order a dismissal.

See State v. Gallagher, 465 A.2d 323, 326 (Conn.

1983).
B. Mr. Ramirez had a right to reasonably resist
the arrest that followed upon the illegal entry
to his home.
Even if the Court does not feel that evidence should be
suppressed pursuant to the illegal entry, Mr. Ramirez asks that he
should be allowed a remand for new trial with the right to instruct
the jury that the entry was illegal and that Mr. Ramirez had a right
to reasonably resist any arrest that immediately followed upon the
illegal entry.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the right of a
person to reasonably resist an illegal arrest based upon both
Article I, Section 14, and the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Bradshaw,

541 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1975), and 802-04 (Henriod j,
concurring); see also White v. Morris, 345 So.2d 461, 465-67 (La.
1977) finding the right to resist under the Fourth Amendment and
Louisiana's own constitution with its broader protections.

In

Bradshaw the officer in question told a citizen he was going to
ticket him for driving on suspension, which in fact, was untrue.
When approached, the citizen told the officer off and walked away.
The Supreme Court ordered Mr. Bradshaw's conviction for interference
reversed.

-17-

In the present case, Officer Rowley entered illegally.

The

officer approached Mr. Ramirez to apprehend him and while doing so
felt that he had been assaulted because Mr. Ramirez1 dog bit him.
(R. 95 at 64). Officer Heaps and Rowley wrestled Mr. Ramirez to the
ground (R. 95 at 57-59).

The only resistance offered by Mr. Ramirez

was that he would not let the officers grab his hands to cuff him.
(Id.) .

This is reasonable resistance to the officers' activities.

Mr. Ramirez had done nothing wrong on the street in front of Trolley
Square other than trying to calm his brother down.
threw the barricade, he ran into his house.
right to be in Livio's house.

When his brother

Officer Rowley had no

And, when the officers attempted to

cuff him after they threw him to the ground, Livio merely refused
for a few minutes to let the cuffing take place.

Mr. Ramirez did

not strike at the officers or otherwise hurt them.
Mr. Ramirez asks the Court to find that his resistance was
a reasonable reaction, not to an illegal arrest, but to an illegal
entry of his home which makes the arrest illegal.

Other states have

applied this principle in cases similar to this one.

In Gallagher,

at 328, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that there is a right to
resist an arrest following an illegal entry of a home.

The illegal

entry in Gallagher, was based on the officer's gaining consent to
enter by trickery.

The resistance was based on Mr. Gallagher's

refusal to leave his home, when arrested by the officers, and the
fight that ensued between the officers and Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher.
In People of Garden City v. Stark, 372 N.W.2d 474 (Mich.App. 1982),
officers were trying to arrest a third party nonresident in a
house.

They did not have a warrant and a fight broke out once they
-18-

entered the house.

Mr. Ramirez1 actions are less egregious than the

actions of defendants in these other two cases.

He refused to call

his dog off, if he had any such power to do so given the fact he was
being handled roughly by strangers in his own home.
took no affirmative actions to hurt the officers.

Mr. Ramirez

He had a right to

such reasonable resistance.

CONCLUSION

For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Livio
Ramirez, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and grant his pretrial motion to suppress all evidence
obtained after the illegal entry or in the alternative remand the
case for a new trial allowing the jury to be instructed on
defendant's right to reasonably resist arrest following an illegal
entry of his home.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this QU

day of October, 1990.

ROBERT L. STEELE
"
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

77-6-9

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

History: C. 1953, 77-6-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Convicted."
Interpretation of term "convicted" to mean a
determination by the court that the accusations constituting the basis for removal were
true, as opposed to the alternative basis for

judgment of removal, the defendant's admission, would reconcile this section with
§ 77-6-7. Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086
(Utah 1985).

77-6-9. Appeal — Suspension from office.
From a judgment of removal an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court
in the same manner as from a judgment in a civil action; but from entry of
judgment and until the judgment is reversed, the defendant shall be suspended from his office. Pending the appeal, the office shall be filled as in the
case of a vacancy.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Writ of prohibition.
If accusation against county attorney
charged acts not legally prohibited, and, therefore, court had no jurisdiction, officer's remedy
by appeal was inadequate because he could be
removed from office upon accusation having no
foundation in law; accordingly, Supreme Court
could issue writ of prohibition to prevent removal. Parker v. Morgan, 48 Utah 405,160 P.
764 (1916).
Where a city commissioner was found guilty

of malfeasance in office by a jury verdict and
petitioned for an extraordinary writ to prohibit
the district court from entering judgment because the effect thereof would be to remove
him from office pending an appeal, the Supreme Court held that the writ of prohibition
should not be granted since to do so would result in circumventing the intended purpose of
this section. Geurts v. District Court, 10 Utah
2d 319, 352 P.2d 778 (1960).

CHAPTER 7
ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
Section
77-7-1.

Section

"Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed.
77-7-2. By peace officers.
77-7-3. By private persons.
77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest.
77-7-5. Issuance of warrant — Time and
place arrests may be made.
77-7-5.5. Fee for warrant service.
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest.
77-7-7. Force in making arrest.
77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken,
when.
77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner.
77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone authoriza-

77-7-11.
77-7-12.
77-7-13.

77-7-14.
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tion of execution of arrest warrant.
Possession of warrant by arresting
officer not required.
Detaining persons suspected of shoplifting or library theft — Persons
authorized.
Arrest without warrant by peace officer — Reasonable grounds, what
constitutes — Exemption from
civil or criminal liability.
Person causing detention or arrest of
person suspected of shoplifting or
library theft — Civil and criminal
immunity.

ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
Section
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect — Grounds.
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk
suspect for dangerous weapon —
Grounds.
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take
possession of weapons.
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge.
77-7-19. Appearance before magistrate —
Failure to appear — Transfer of
cases — Motor vehicle violations.

77-7-2

Section
77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant —
Filing in court — Contents of citations.
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation — Voluntary
forfeiture of bail — Information,
when required.
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor.
77-7-23. Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to magistrate —
Transfer to court with jurisdiction
— Violation as misdemeanor.

77-7-1. "Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed.
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission to
custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and detention.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. — Legislators privileged
from arrest, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. VI,
§ 8.
National Guard members privileged from arrest at certain times, exceptions, § 39-1-54.

State guard, exemption from arrest while on
duty, exceptions, § 39-4-12.
Unlawful
detention a misdemeanor,
§ 76-5-304.
Voters privileged from arrest on election
day, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. IV, § 3.
Witnesses obeying summons not subject to
arrest, § 77-21-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
What constitutes "arrest"
An arrest could not be made without the
presence of an intention on the part of the arresting officer to make the arrest; notice of arrest should have been given, either expressly
or by implication, and without such notice no

amount of physical restraint could constitute
an arrest. State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360,10
P.2d 1073 (1932).
An arrest must have been made in the manner authorized by law. Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah
90, 138 P.2d 246 (1943).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Comment, Arrest
Record Expungement — A Function of the
Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381.
Note: Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City
Police Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest § 1 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 1 et seq.

77-7-2. By peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of
any peace officer; presence" includes all of the physical senses or any
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
451
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(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch.
161, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 1986, deleted "other
than offenses under Title 41 where any non-jurisdictional element of the offense is" preceding "committed or attempted" in Subsection
(1).
Cross-References. — Children, grounds for
taking into custody, § 78-3a-29.
City police officers' arrest powers,
§§ 10-3-914, 10-3-915, 10-3-919.
Conservation officers' authority, §§ 23-20-1,
23-20-1.5.

Force which peace officer may use in making
arrest, §§ 76-2-404, 77-7-7.
Highway patrol, arrest power, § 27-10-5.
Livestock
brand inspectors' powers,
§ 4-24-28.
Motor Carrier Act, arrests to enforce,
§§ 54-6-44, 54-6-45.
Sheriffs power to arrest, §§ 17-22-2(l)(b).
Special police, arrest power on specified
property, §§ 67-12-4, 67-12-13.
Traffic rules and regulations, arrest for violation, § 41-6-169.
Water law, arrest powers of state engineer
and water commissioners, § 73-2-9.
Weights and measures, arrest powers of department, § 4-9-7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arrest without warrant.
—Misdemeanor.
Authority to sign complaint.
False imprisonment.
Instructions.
"Public offense."
Reasonable cause.
Seizure of goods in making arrest.
Cited.
Arrest without warrant
Police officers were authorized to make a
warrantless arrest of defendant for violation of
parole occasioned by association with known
felons and attempted flight to avoid arrest
where the officers had been notified by a reliable informant of the location of a house trailer
containing an escaped prison convict and other
parolees» defendant was identified as a parolee
by an officer at the scene and was observed to
make several trips into the trailer, and when
the officers ordered the occupants of the trailer
to surrender, the defendant came out, sounded
the horn on his automobile in an attempt to
alert the other occupants of the trailer, and
attempted to drive away. State v. Kent, 665
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983).
Officers had probable cause to arrest based
on controlled buys of narcotics which had been
conducted prior to the search. State v. Banks,
720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).

—Misdemeanor.
Officer could not legally make arrest without
warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases
unless offense was committed or attempted in
his presence, and arrest was made immediately or within reasonable time thereafter.
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P.23
(1926).
Plea of guilty to misdemeanor did not legalize unlawful arrest without warrant nor bar
action against arresting officer for false imprisonment, if offense was not committed in officer's presence or arrest was not made immediately or within reasonable time. Oleson v.
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
Authority to sign complaint
District judge improperly dismissed complaint signed by officer other than arresting
officer since this section deals only with the
subject of making arrest and not with filing of
complaints and is not, therefore, authority for
proposition that only arresting officer has authority to sign complaint. Salt Lake City v.
Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967).
False imprisonment
If a sheriff in making an arrest was not able
to justify the same under some of the provisions of this section, it was false and unlawful,
and he was liable in a civil action for false imprisonment. Johnson v. Leigh, 74 Utah 286,
279 P. 501 (1929).
A peace officer would not necessarily be held
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Police Dog: Possibilities for Abuse in Finding Probable Cause
for Arrest, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 408.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest §§ 4,
24-33 44-49.
C.J.S. — 6A C J.S. Arrest §§ 7-9,16-37, 51.

A.L.R. — What amounts to violation of
drunken driving statute in officer's "presence"
or "view" so as to permit warrantless arrest, 74
A.L.R.3d 1138.
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 62, 63.1, 65, 67.

77-7-3. By private persons.
A private person may arrest another:
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence; or
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has reasonable cause to
believe the person arrested has committed it.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — Force that may be
used in making arrest, §§ 76-2-403, 77-7-7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arrest of robber.
Right to make arrest.
Arrest of robber.
Where facts showing commission of robbery
were reported to sheriffs posse, members
thereof, although private citizens and non-residents of county, could follow, and capture by
use of such force as necessary, persons who
committed robbery. State v. Morgan, 22 Utah
162, 61 P. 527 (1900).
Private citizen approached by robber with
gun was authorized to use whatever force was

necessary to disarm defendant and prevent his
escape. State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P.
865, 110 Am. St. R. 639 (1905).
Where defendant was told to put up his
hands, he was, in effect, placed under arrest.
State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865, 110
Am. St. R. 639 (1905).
Right to make arrest
Deputy sheriff, although out of his state, constable, although out of his county, and their
two companions, although not officers, under
the circumstances, had right to arrest defendant and his confederate in crime. People v.
Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94 (1896).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest
§§ 34-36.
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest §§ 12*15.
A.L.R. — Private person's authority, in
making arrest for felony, to shoot or kill alleged felon, 32 A.L.R.3d 1078.

Liability of private citizen, calling on police
for assistance after disturbance or trespass, for
false arrest by officer, 98 A.LJt3d 542.
Key Numbers. — Arrest *» 64.

77-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest
A magistrate may orally require a peace ofiBcer to arrest anyone committing or attempting to commit a public offense in the presence of the magistrate, and, in the case of an emergency, when probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally authorize a peace ofiBcer to arrest a person for a public
offense, and thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be filed
against the person arrested.

454

ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
History: C. 1953, 77-7-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-7-5.5

Cross-References. — Assault in presence of
magistrate, § 77-3-10.

77-7-5. Issuance of warrant — Time and place arrests may
be made,
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the
offense charged is:
( l ) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of the
day or night; or
(2) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night
only if:
(a) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the warrant;
(b) the person to be arrested is upon a public highway or in a
public place or a place open to or accessible to the public; or
(c) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in the
regular course of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1987, ch. 103, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment designated the former provisions of Subsection (2) as Subsection (2)(a) and added
present Subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c).

Cross-References. — Fee of constable executing arrest warrant, § 21-3-3.5.
Rules of evidence inapplicable to proceedings
for issuance of warrant for arrest, Rule 1101,
U.R.E.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 79.
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 51.
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 67.

77-7-5.5. Fee for warrant service.
(1) When a warrant is served, as a supplement to any bail posted, bail
forfeited, fine imposed, or other assessment, a fee of $85 shall be collected
from all persons for whom the warrant is issued by a court of record in the
state. However, the court may choose not to impose the fee if good cause is
shown.
(2) The fee is payable to the clerk of the court.
(3) The fee is refundable to the person named on the warrant if the court
finds that the warrant was improperly issued or invalid when executed.
(4) The fee under this section shall be distributed:
(a) first, $35 to the General Fund; and
(b) second, $50 to the general fund of the governmental entity effecting
satisfaction of the warrant.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-5.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 152, § 16.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 152

became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25.
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77-7-6. Manner of making arrest.
The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of his
intention, cause and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be required
when:
•' M
(1) There is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety
of the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being
arrested to escape;
--\^
(2) The person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission 'of,
or an attempt to commit, an offense; or
(3) The person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense or an escape.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. — Dogs used in law en-

forcement, immunity from liability for injury
by, § 18-1-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Failure to give notice.
Notice not required.
Response of person arrested.
Failure to give notice.
In a false imprisonment action, a plain
clotbes security officer who accosted a customer was not justified on the basis of privilege
to make an arrest for assault or suspected
shoplifting where no timely explanation was
given. McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984).

Notice not required.
Private persons were not required to give notice of their intention to arrest defendant and
his confederate in crime, where latter, when
first seen, were engaged in commission of criminal act. People v. Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P.
94 (1896).
< «:
Response of person arrested.
iq
Where the defendant's response to the officer
who arrested him was voluntary and spontaneous and was not prompted by custodial interrogation, there was no violation of this section.
State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest
§§ 69-72.
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest §§ 45, 47, 48.
AX.R. — Necessity that Miranda warnings

include express reference to right to have attorney present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R
Fed. 123.
Key Numbers. — Arrest «=» 68.

77-7-7. Force in making arrest.
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed
of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used only as provided in Section
76-2-404.
"V History: C. 1953, 77-7-7, enacted by L.
Cross-References. — Force which peace officer may use in making arrest, § 76-2-404.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-7-9

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability.
—Writ of restitution.

of restitution for premises. Marks v. Sullivan,
9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224 (1893).

Section applied to a constable serving a writ
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest felon, right of peace officer to use, 83 A.L.R.3d
§§ 80-85.
174.
C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest § 49.
Peace officer's liability for death or personal
A.L.R* — Excessive force used in accom- injuries caused by intentional force in arrestplishing lawful arrest, right to resist, 77 fag misdemeanant, 83 A.L.R.3d 238.
A.L.R.3d 281.
Key Numbers. — Arrest *> 68.
Deadly force in attempting to arrest fleeing

77-7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when.
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all
cases, a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which
the person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for
believing him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and explain the purpose for which admission is desired. Demand and
explanation need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section
77-7-6 or where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Felony in progress.
Officers could break open doors of building at
night where they had reasonable grounds to
believe a felony was being committed therein,
and assault with deadly weapon upon officer

was not justifiable, even though he did not first
demand admittance and explain his purpose,
State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 P. 1104
(1917).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest
§§ 86-93.

C.J.S. — 6A CJ.S. Arrest §§ 54-56.
Key Numbers. — Arrest *» 68.

77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner.
Any person making an arrest may seize from the person arrested all
weapons which he may have on or about his person.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. — Property taken from
arrested person, receipt for, § 77-24-5.
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1

A

Nineteen years,

2

Q

And what~ are your duties?

3

A

I work in auto theft.

4

Q

What is your training, sir?

5

A

I've been a police officer for 19 years,

5

what you mean by training.

7
8

I don't know

|

Q

What training have you had to become a, police Qffice£?

A

Oh, I was—went through POST and was certified as a

9 J police officer,
10
lx

12
13

14
15
16

Q

Thank you.

Did you happen to be on duty in the early

morning hours of the 19th of May, 1990?o
A

No.

I wasn't on duty.

Q

What were you involved with at that time?

A

I was working or was assisting Channel 4 News.

They

were in the process of doing some filming and I was taking them
around.

17

Q

Was this a police-related activity?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And did you happen to be in the vicinity around Fifth

20

South and Seventh East?

21

A

Yes, sir.

22

Q

Is that in Salt Lake County?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Did anything unusual take place at that time and place?

A

Yes, sir.

23
24

25

As we were southbound on Seventh East,

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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1

approximately 450 South on 700 East, we observed two individuals

2

standing on the corner on the, would be the southeast corner of

3

Seventh East, and they were quite vocal, making quite a bit of

4

noise.

5

Q

And then what happened?

6

A

As we passed through the intersection, we slowed down,

7

still watching the traffic and also watching the two individuals,

8

the light was red.

9

from Trolley Square.

I observed a man walking east on Seventh East
As he reached the east side of Seventh

10

East, one of the two men came out after him and started swinging

11

at him.

12

made a U-turn and was now facing north on 700 East.

13

Q

At that time, 1 pulled my car up over the island and

And after you made your turn and facing in that

14

direction, what happened in relationship to the two individuals

15

you were observing?

16

A

I stopped approximately 100, 150 feet south of the

17

intersection.

I was parked next to some barricades, I was

18

parked directly in front of Mullboon's.

19

running up to the car, as I got out of the car, I identified

20

myself as a police officer, I wasn't in uniform*

21

had to get out of the street.

22

the street, I could see that they were very intoxicated, and they

23

had—the one individual, the larger of the two, said something

24

but I couldn't understand what he was saying.

25

walking back towards the sidewalk.

The two individuals came

Told them they

They started walking back towards

And they started

I got back in my vehicle at
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5

1

that time.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

I requested a back, and gave my location, but I gave
the wrong location.

When I realized I'd given the wrong

location, I corrected myself and was telling the dispatcher what
my correct location was; at that time, a barricade came through
the side window, or the passenger side window of my car.
Q

When you say a barricade, sir, what is that, exactly?

A

It's a street barricade, the little sawhorse type with

a little reflector on it, it's made out of metal with wood
across the top of i t , —
Q

And what

A

—painted black and white.

Q

I'm sorry.

A

The barricade came through the passenger, right passenge^

did —

And where did it hit your car?

front window and also punched a hole in the front door.
Q

Were there other people in the car with you?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

What was the result-of that barricade hitting your car?

A

One of the passengers received glass in her eye, and

no one else was injured.

21

Q

And then what happened?

22

A

At that time, I asked where my back was, and Officer

23

J Rowley indicated that he had arrived but couldn't find me.

*

• indicated that—I checked to make sure that he had gone to the
correction location, not the one I'd given originally.
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I

Just as I

1

indicated—I told him where we were a second time, I saw him, I

2

indicated that the two people involved were on the sidewalk. At

3

that time, they saw the car and they started running east through

4

the parking lot of Utah Idaho Supply, School Supply.

5

Q

And what action did you take?

6

A

I got out of my car and chased them through the parking

7

lot, they went up over the fence and I went up over the fence

8

also.

9

Officer Bigelow, the other one continued running.

The larger individual was apprehended by myself and

10

Q

And did you identify the larger individual?

11

A

He was later identified as a Gabriel Ramirez.

12

Q

And the—the barricade hitting your car; what did these

13

two individuals have to do with that?

14
15

A

At that time, I didn't know which one, but one of them

had thrown the barricade through the car.

16

MR. UPDEGROVE:

17

THE COURT:

18

Is that all the questions you have,

Mr. Updegrove?

19

MR. UPDEGROVE:

20

THE COURT:

21
22
23

Thank you.

and see where we are?
*

All right.

Yes.

I'm sorry, sir.

At the moment.

Maybe we can interrupt for just a minute
Not quite ready on this one?
Mr. Steele, you can go ahead with cross-

examination.

24

(Whereupon, t h e C o u r t h a n d l e d an u n r e l a t e d

25

THE COURT: A l l r i g h t ,

matter.)

Mr. S t e e l e , c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n
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of

1

Officer

Smith.

2

CROSS-EXAMINATION

3

BY MR. STEELE;

4

Q

Officer Smith, when the—the two males took off, y o u —

5

you followed Gabriel and caught him, that's the person you

6

apprehended; that's right?

7
8

9

I

A

I followed both of them until they split, but yes.

Q

You didn't choose to follow Livio, you chose the

larger individual?

10

A

Yes.

^

Q

Okay.

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

The reason you chose him was you suspected he

had thrown the barricade?
A

Yes.

He w a s —

I believed he was the one who threw it, but I

didn't know who had thrown it.
Q

He was the one who had been vocal at you, you weren't

sure what he said, but he was the one that yelled at you?
A

He was the one who was the most aggressive and the one

who was swinging at the other individual, but they were both

19

vocal.

20

Q

Did L i v i o y e l l a t you a t t h a t — a t t h a t

21

A

Which t i m e was t h a t ?

22

Q

When you s a i d you a p p r o a c h e d , o r t h a t t h e two m a l e s

time?

23

a p p r o a c h e d y o u , and Gabby y e l l e d s o m e t h i n g a t y o u , t h e

24

one y e l l e d something a t you.

25

A

Oh, I d o n ' t know.

larger

L i v i o was t h e r e , and I d o n ' t know i f
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8

1

Q

Then what happened?

2

A

Okay.

At that point, Officer Smith continued through

3

the back lot where the fence was and got out of his car. I

4

decided to go up Hawthorne Avenue, which is on the south of that

5

fence.

6

Q

7
8
9
10
11
12

Well, let's—let's stop there for a second.

Who was

riding with—who, if anyone, was riding with you?
A

The two individuals that were running at the time, were

later identified as Gabby and his brother, Livio, Ramirez.
is that who you're asking?
Q

No. No, sir. I said, who, if anyone, was riding with

you on that—

13

A

Oh, riding with me?

14

Q

And what did Officer Bigelow do, before you went up

15

Hawthorne?

16

A

It was just Officer Bigelow.

H e — h e just observed the two people running across,

17

pointed them out to me, I was driving, so I made a decision to

18

go around the other side of the fence.

19

Q

Did Officer Bigelow stay in the car with you?

20

A

At that point, yes.

21

Q

When did he depart the car?

22

A

As we pulled up Hawthorne Avenue, Gabby Ramirez had

23

slipped and fallen in front of the car in a driveway on Hawthorne

24

Avenue.

25

apprehend him.

I stopped, Officer Bigelow got out and started to
Officer Smith had come over the fence and
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1

assisted him in apprehending Gabby Ramirez.

2
3

I continued on after the other individual that split
from that location.

4

Q

Could you still see him?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

Do you want me to continue?

8

Q

Please.

9

A

Okay.

They both split from the same location.

The individual seated at the defense counsel

10

there, Livio Ramirez, had run to the east location of a vacant

11

lot, where some houses were taken out on Hawthorne Avenue, and

12

it's vacant from Hawthorne, which is 550 South, all the way to

13

Sixth South.

14

and I went through the only roadway, a dirt roadway that was

15

made there by the construction crew.

16

the street to Sixth South and into a house, approximately 736

17

East Sixth South.

18
19
20
21

He continued along the east fence of that lot,

And he continued across

As he crossed the street, I pulled my car up to the
curb, jumped out of the car and chased him into that residence.
Q

How soon after the individual you were chasing entered

the home did you follow?

22

A

Couldn't have been more than ten to 12 seconds.

23

Q

And did you confront that individual in the home once

24
25

you were there?
A

Okay.

I entered the front door of the house, in the
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1

living room.

2

He was standing in the kitchen area of the house,

which was very dark, and a dog apparently—

3
4
5

Q

Well, let's not get into the dog.

A

Okay. Well, anyway, he w a s — I confronted him as he

approached the doorway of the kitchen area facing the living room.

6

He could—we visually had visual contact with each other at that

7

point.

8

Q

9

Was the individual you confronted in the home the same

individual you chased?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Is that individual present in the courtroom?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Thank you.

14

MR. UPDEGROVE:

15

THE COURT:
I
1

19

22

It will.

MR. UPDEGROVE:

I think that's all I have at the moment,

your Honor.

I

MR. STEELE:
THE COURT:

21

Your Honor, may the record reflect he's

identified the defendant?

16
17

He's at defense table there with Mr. Steele.

I

If I could have just one moment, please,
Sure.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. STEELE:

23

Q

Officer

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

— d o you remember what the call for assistance was, the

Rowley—
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1

2

contact call?
A

Well, there was a—originally a call to assist with a

3

drunk, and then the call called for it to speed up the back-up

4

'cause he was having problems.

5
6
7

Q

So, the first time you saw Livio, he was pointed out to

you by Officer Bigelow; is that right?
A

He pointed out two individuals.

He didn't point

8

Mr. Livio, as per se; both individuals were running across

9

Seventh East to that location I said earlier to the prosecutor,

10

Q

And you didn't see him prior to that time at all?

11

A

The first time I saw two individuals as they ran

12
13
14

across Seventh East, that's correct.
Q

And you—Livio ran into a house and you followed him

immediately into a residence, it was a residence?

15

A

It was a duplex, or a residence, yes.

16

Q

But you—you weren't in a common area of a duplex, you

17

were in someone's half of that duplex?

18

A

I don't understand what you mean by common area.

19

Q

Excuse me, Officer.

20
21
22

Some—some duplexes may have a

common entrance, and then door—doors inside the complex.
A

Oh.

This—this has a separated porch, is that what

you're asking?

Yes.

23

Q

Yes.

24

A

Okay.

25

Q

And L i v i o was i n a d a r k p o r t i o n of t h e k i t c h e n

area?
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1

that there would be no way for Officer Rowley to know which of

2

the two running away would be that intoxicated individual that

3

had been causing the problems, but neither did he have a n y —

4

any indication that Livio had committed some sort of a crime.

5

There—then upon getting to the residence, he had no

6

probable cause in exigent circumstances upon which to enter.

7

There's no offense that Livio was fleeing from at that point,

8

no evidence about to be destroyed, and even Officer Rowley

9

suspected something had gone on, did not know what it was, said

10

he suspected an assault; but all the information he had was an

11

intoxicated individual and needing some back-up.

12

I would point to Welsh v. Wisconsin, a United States

13

Supreme Court case from 1984, talking about hot pursuit, and

14

warrantless entry into a home for—under probable cause in

15

exigent circumstances, that the gravity of the offense that

16

they're following for has something to do with it, that it

17

doesn't draw the line at misdemeanors versus felonies, but that's

18

something that has to be weighed.

19

Hot pursuit, has been allowed by the Supreme Court,

20

U.S. v. Santana, for a fleeing felon,. Warden v. Hayden, another

21

fleeing felon, or destruction of evidence, Smurder v. California.

22

This is not one of those situations, nor was it assumed to be by

23

Officer

24

25

Rowley.
T h e y — t h e S t a t e c a n n o t overcome t h e

presumptive

u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of a w a r r a n t l e s s e n t r y i n t o a p e r s o n ' s home.
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1

Under Welsh, there—the crime, if any, was a minor one*

2

unclear that Livio had committed any crime, so under Welsh—

3

under Welsh, it was the clear the person they were going after

4

had committed a crime, or they had reasonable—reasonable cause.

5

No crime had been committed in the arresting officer's presence,

6

or pursuing officer's presence, no crime had been committed by

7

Livio prior to the warrantless entry at all.

8
9

It's

The officer wanted to talk to Livio, which seems to me
puts it under reasonable articulable suspicion in 77-7-15 to

10

question concerning, Livio's activities at a scene.

11

the officer may have had reasonable articulable suspicion to

12

question Livio, but the statute itself says, may stop in a

13

public place.

14

He may h a v e —

He was not stopped in a public place.

I would further argue that if the Court that—that this

15

entry was good under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, that

16

Article I, Section 14 would protect against such an entry.

17

Utah Supreme Court just recently, in Morrocco, found that in

18

some circumstances, Article 1, Section 14 has broader protections

19

than the Fourth Amendment.

20

is a different case, but it's a vehicle search case requiring

21

probable cause in exigent circumstances for an entry and search.

22

The officers just did not have enough.

23

reasonable articulable suspicion but that is not enough under

24

Welsh or under Morrocco to enter a home following someone.

25

The

In Morrocco, itself, I would admit

They had perhaps

And I would submit it on that, your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

Let me just ask a question because it's not

2

clear, and I don't know much about the facts of the case, we

3

didn't get much beyond the officer's entry into the duplex, I

4

guess it was a duplex.

5

here?

6

MR. STEELE:

What evidence are you seeking to suppress

Your Honor, I—that's—that's a good

7

question.

There—everything that Livio is charged with happened

8

after the entry.

9

officer, the other is resisting arrest.

One of the charges is assault on a peace
It seems to me the

10

purpose of the exclusionary rule is to give limits to police

11

conduct, not necessarily to function as a rule of evidence, but

12

to say can't enter the home under these circumstances.

13

So we would be asking under the purpose of the

14

exclusionary rule that no crimes had been committed, that—that

15

the evidence of the crimes having been committed should be

16

excluded because they happened after the entry by the officer,

17

and that absent his entry, there could have been no arrest, and

18

certainly that charge—I mean, he couldn't have resisted, if the

19

officer hadn't—could not have entered.

20

THE COURT:

So what you're really saying, 'cause this

21

is different than a normal situation, as I understand it, and

22

just reading the probable cause statement, the alleged offense

23

is an assault upon Officer Rowley.

24

essence is, that because his entry was illegal, at least according

25

to your argument, that the crime ought to be dismissed.

And what you're saying, in

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

25

1

MR, STEELE:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes, your Honor.
In effect saying the conduct the defendant

committed was justified because of the illegal entry; isn't that

4

really what you're saying?

5

MR. STEELE:

6

THE COURT:

Yes.

I think so.

Sort of like you can use a certain amount

7

of force to repel an unlawful assault or an unlawful arrest even

8

by a police officer?

9

MR. STEELE:

Yes, and I—the reasonableness of his

10

action do have to be considered, I think, and perhaps I should

11

have put him on the stand, and perhaps we should have developed

12

that into the testimony.

13

THE COURT:

14

It's just a little different than the

usual suppression.

15

MR. STEELE:

16

THE COURT:

Yes.
We're really not suppressing evidence,

I 'cause the evidence is as I understand the probable cause
18

statement, where he said, "Sic 'em" or something to that

19

effect?

20

I

MR. STEELE:

21

I

THE COURT:

Yes.
So, it's really dismiss the crime, that's

22

the motion, alleging that the—because the entry may have been

23

unlawful, that the defendant's conduct was justified, and

24

therefore, it's a defense of justification to the crime itself.

25

Isn't that really what you're saying?
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1

biggest stumbling block I have from what I've heard so far is

2

that normally, we just don't dismiss cases at a pretrial

3

evidentiary hearing based on a defense of justification,

4

Usually, that's an affirmative defense that's presented at the

5

trial and left for the trier of fact after hearing all the

6

evidence from both sides to decide whether there was

7

justification, and really, that's what it seems to me you're

8

asking me to do here.

9
10
11

How would you address that?

How would this be

appropriate for a pretrial motion?
MR- STEELE:

Your Honor, I mean this—that's—that's a

12

difficult question to answer, but I would turn it around and tell

13

the Court that I can't really address it at trial, either,

14

because an illegal entry, unless the Court made a finding that

15

the entry was illegal, that's not something a jury can determine,

16

or all that would be irrelevant to the jury.

17

issue of whether the officer should have been there or not is

18

irrelevant there.

So, at trial, the

19

So, I'm caught between two difficult points.

20

THE CODRT:

21

MR. STEELE:

22

THE COURT:

The entry certainly is a legal question.
Yes.
And what you're saying is that what—what

23

you'd have to do on most, if instruct the jury, if I found that

24

the entry was illegal, would be to instruct them that it was

25

illegal and then you could argue, that because of the illegal
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1

entry, he was justified in using the force that, he did, if he

2

sicced the dog, or whatever he did, I didn't hear any of those

3

facts.

Okay?

4

Anything else on that point?

5

MR. STEELE:

And I would just point to my claim for the

6

purpose of the exclusionary rule, it isn't a Rule of Evidence,

7

it's a rule designed to have a legal control over the limits of

8

the police officer's activities.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. STEELE:

11
12
13

Okay.
And I don't think this is—this is an

unusual application of that, but not outside of that purpose.
THE COURT:

Outside of the purpose of the rule, of the

enforcement.

14

I'm going to take it under advisement and take a look

15

at both of those issues, it seems to me there are two, and that

16

number one, as I've already said, is a motion to dismiss based

17

on the defense of justification appropriate at this juncture,

18

should it be reserved as a question of fact for the trier of

19

fact after, I guess, I make some threshold finding as to whether

20

or not the entry was legal or illegal, and then the follow-up to

21

that, was the entry justified as being in hot pursuit?

22

look at the three cases that you've cited.

23

And I'll

I'll ask you to supply me if you would, though, with

24

a copy of Morrocco, in fact, maybe you should also give me

25

Welsh, if you would, and maybe would you mind giving me a copy
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